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Abstract—Safety is an essential requirement for railway
transportation. There are many methods that have been devel-
oped to predict, prevent and mitigate accidents in this context.
All of these methods have their own purpose and limitations.
This paper presents a new useful analysis technique: timed
fault tree analysis. This method extends traditional fault tree
analysis with temporal events and fault characteristics. Timed
Fault Trees (TFTs) can determine which faults need to be
eliminated urgently, and it can also provide a safe time
window to repair them. They can also be used to determine
the time taken for railway maintenance requirements, and
thereby improve maintenance efficiency, and reduce risks. In
this paper, we present the features and functionality of a
railway transportation system based on timed fault tree models.
We demonstrate the applicability of our framework via a case
study of the China Yongwen line railway accident.
Keywords-railway transportation systems; fault tree analysis;
risk analysis; timed fault trees
I. INTRODUCTION
System safety relies on robust safety design, good man-
agement, and efficient maintenance. System safety is an
essential requirement of a railway transportation system. Pri-
mary risks include derailment, collision and fire to property
and personnel [1]. Some of the key safety issues in railway
transportation systems are discussed in [2].
Railway safety was recently highlighted in China. In 2011,
two high-speed trains travelling on the Yongwen railway
line collided on a viaduct in the suburbs of Wenzhou City,
Zhejiang Province. In Figure 1, we show that a 16-car
CRH1B EMU working train D3115 between Hangzhou and
Fuzhou had apparently been brought to a stand by a lightning
strike. As it was moving off around 20 minutes later, it was
hit from the rear by Beijing-Fuzhou train D301, operated by
a 16-car CRH2E. Six cars were derailed, of which four fell
off the 20 metres high viaduct and 40 people were killed,
at least 192 were injured.
In order to render railway systems as safe as possible, a
large number of analysis techniques have been developed,
such as hazard and operability study (HAZOP), failure mode
and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) [3],
functional hazard analysis, and event tree analysis (ETA).
FTA is an important logic and probabilistic technique, and
is mostly used in system reliability and safety [4].
HAZOP is a structured and systematic examination of a
planned or existing process to identify and evaluate risks.
This technique is mainly used in chemical process systems,
and is a qualitative technique that involves applying a set of
descriptors to a number of parameters. FMEA is an effective
analytical tool used to examine possible failure modes and to
eliminate potential failure during system designs [5]. FMEA
effectively depends on the members of the committee, and it
is limited by their experience of previous failures, but also is
unable to discover complex failure modes. ETA is a logical
evaluative process that involves tracing forward in time or
through a causal chain, whereas FTA is a deductive process.
Although ETA allows one to identify the effect of a given
event path on a system, it cannot pinpoint the specific event
that leads to an accident.
FTA is a powerful diagnostic technique used to demon-
strate the root causes of undesired events using logical and
functional relationships among components, processes, and
subsystems [6]. A fault tree (FT) is a model which logically
and graphically represents the various combinations of pos-
sible events, either faulty or normal, that occur in a system
and lead to unexpected events or states [7]. FTs can be used
to identify the cause of undesired events [4], [8]. Faults can
be due to hardware failure, software error, or human error.
Traditional FTA has been applied to various applications.
These applications include a number of high hazard indus-
tries such as nuclear power [9], the oil industry [10], and
traffic [2], as well as applications in mechanical engineering
[11], [12]. In general, FTA is useful to analyse and predict
system reliability and safety [13].
Traditional FTA involves events and gates, and employs
Boolean algebra. Logic modelling is used to graphically
represent relationships among basic events. FTA is usually
carried out at two levels: a qualitative level in which a list
of all possible combinations of events that lead to an event
called the Top Event is determined (minimal cut sets), and a
quantitative level in which the probability of the occurrence
of the nodes in the tree can be calculated [9], [14].
Several methods have been proposed to improve FTA
to solve specific problems. One of these involves the use
of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [15], [16]. In this
approach, a failure mode is represented using a Boolean
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Figure 1. The Yongwen railway line and the accident.
equation, which can be manipulated mathematically. This
approach overcomes some disadvantages of traditional FTA
by enabling efficient and exact qualitative and quantitative
analysis of fault trees [17]. However, the BDD approach
does not involve direct analysis of a fault free, but of an
alternative representation [18]. This can lead to problems (an
error in the BBD representation may be hard to translate to
the original context, for example, [18]).
In this paper, we present a case study of using a novel
analysis technique, which is Timed Fault Trees (TFTs). The
term “Timed Fault Tree” has already been employed in [19]
in their future work for temporal fault trees. But the term in
our context follows the style of time-dependent fault tree in
[20]. The purpose of our TFTs is to analyse the relationship
between safety and time in systems that are traditionally
modelled using FTA. In this paper, the questions that we
want to address, that are not amenable to analysis using
FTA include: if two parts of the system require maintenance,
which part should be repaired first? How long can a repair
wait, so that a given hazard can be avoided?
This paper is organised as follows. First, we present the
underlying railway system that will be analysed. Second,
we introduce the TFT technique, and describe the analysis
process using this technique. Then, we demonstrate the
applicability of our technique by a case study of the China
Yongwen line railway accident in Section IV. Finally, we
conclude and propose directions for future research.
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Figure 2. System composition.
II. RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
The signal system, which consists of a set of traffic
controls and train operation controls, is one of the most
important electrical and mechanical systems in the rail
transportation system. It is directly related to operation
safety, operation efficiency, and service quality. It should
guarantee the safety of the passengers and trains, ensuring
that the transportation is fast, frequent, and organised. Haz-
ards discussed in this paper are mainly due to signal system
failures.
China Railways High-speed (CRH) Electric Multiple Unit
(EMU) signal system includes Chinese Train Control Sys-
tem (CTCS), Computer Based Interlocking system (CBI),
Centralised Traffic Control System (CTC), and Centralised
Signalling Monitoring system (CSM). The system composi-
tion is depicted in Figure 2, and can be explained as follows:
• CTCS is a control system that ensures the safe running
of the trains. It includes three subsystems: Automatic
Train Supervision (ATS), Automatic Train Protection
(ATP), Automatic Train Operation (ATO).
• CBI is responsible for the safety interlocking rela-
tionship of the turnout, signal, and tracks. It receives
command instructions from the ATS or operator, and
sends out interlocking information to ATP or ATS.
• As the command centre, CTC is responsible for mon-
itoring train running, tracking trains, adjusting trains’
running plan and any temporary speed limit.
• Centralised Signalling Monitoring system (CSM) is
responsible for monitoring all the above systems status
in the signal system.
CTCS includes ATO, ATP, and ATS. Their roles are
described as follows.
• ATP is responsible for the safe distance between trains,
over speed protection, and door control, which includes
trackside equipment, interlocking equipment, and on-
board equipment. Ground-based ATP transmits infor-
mation to trains, then the on-board ATP calculates and
provides control information to make the trains run
under the speed limit. The train doors can only be
opened if appropriate information is detected by ATP
and the required conditions are met.
• ATS supervises train operation. It is in charge of the
transition to automatic switching, scheduling the trains
according to the train running plan and passenger
traffic, selecting and maintaining routes, automatically
or manually adjusting the stop and running time,
and transferring command from the Operating Control
Center (OCC) to the train. ATS includes the central
computer and display equipment in OCC, control and
recording equipment, field equipment (station, depot,
and parking), and transmission channels.
• ATO is responsible for the automatic adjustment of train
speed, traction and braking instructions, and stopping
the train within a given accuracy. The ATO equip-
ment includes the controller, receive/transmit antennas,
signs coil and so on. ATO is useful for enhancing
passenger comfort and reducing the labor intensity of
the drivers. Functions of ATO include auto-piloting,
automatic speed control, automatic parking, designated
parking, and door control.
The relationship between the ATO, ATP, and ATS is
described below. ATP is the heart of the safety of CTCS,
and is essential for the security of train operation. ATS
is a part of the top management and command center of
the CTCS. ATO is responsible for the optimisation of the
CTCS. A CTCS system relies on the coordination of the
three subsystems.
ATO, which is under the supervision of the ATP, obtains
the train’s running instruction of ATS from ATP. ATO
calculates the running speed according to the route status,
and determines and executes the control command. After
arriving at a station, ATO issues a door open command
after the appropriate safety condition has been satisfied (as
demonstrated by an ATP check). At the same time, ATO
transfers train information to a ground communicator via
the Positive Train Identification (PTI) system antenna, which
it then sends to ATS. ATS determines a new assignment
according to the available train information, and sends it
back to ATO through the track circuit. When entering a new
track section, ATO will receive new ground information so
as to adjust the speed, and flexibly switch to ATO mode.
In order to facilitate the procedure described above, the
signal system requires a coordinated set of control systems:
ground control, on-board control, field control, and central
control. This system is responsible for traffic control, oper-
ation adjustment, and automatic pilot. Our new technique,
TFTs, is a valuable tool for assessing risks in this context. It
will help to determine which faults require urgent attention,
and to evaluate the time available to fix a fault before an
accident will occur as a consequence of the fault. TFTs can
then be used to construct an emergency plan.
III. TIMED FAULT TREES
In this section, we present formal notation that is relevant
to analysis technique using timed fault trees (TFTs).
A. TFTs representation
TFTs are an extension of traditional FTs that follow the
same top down approach but includes two additional time
parameters. These allow us to discover urgent faults and a
safe time window to repair them. Time parameters have been
included in the definitions of events and gates. Events have
two time parameters: the duration time and the start time of
the event. The gate has one time parameter, namely delay
time. The delay time is the time between an input event and
a corresponding output. For example, at an AND gate there
may be a delay between the receipt of the two inputs and
the output of their sum.
Traditional solution of fault trees involves the determi-
nation of the so-called Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs). Cut sets
are the unique combinations of component failures that can
cause system failure. A cut set is said to be a minimal cut
set if, when any basic event is removed from the set, the
remaining events collectively are no longer a cut set [21].
B. TFTs notation
In this section, we define the syntax of TFTs. In all cases,
capital letters refer to events, and a superscript denotes an
event in a sequence (e.g., A(n)). Lowercase letters denote
duration time (of a fault, event, or hazard), and the duration
of event A say is denoted a (etc.). Similarly, the duration of
A(n) is denoted a(n).
A duration time a is assumed to belong to interval
[amin, amax]. (Similarly, a(n) ∈ [a(n)min, a(n)max]). The start
time of an event is denoted using the associated lower
case letter followed by s. So the start time of event A
is denoted as, where as ∈ [asmin, asmax]. (Similarly,
as(n) ∈ [as(n)min, as(n)max]).
Note the difference between a and as: they denote the
duration and start time of event A respectively. As an
example, suppose that A is the event “applying brakes” and
it takes between 15 and 50 seconds for the train to stop. In
this case amin = 15 and as = 0.
We use the superscript ∗ to denote the actual time that
an event occurs (i.e., a∗ or a(n)∗). This value depends on
the events below A (and A(n)) in the fault tree. We use
the term actual time to refer to this value, and assume that
a∗ ∈ [a∗min, a∗max], and a(n)∗ ∈ [a(n)∗min , a(n)∗max].
Gates are denoted G(1), G(2), ..., G(n), and we say that
gate G(i) has index i. If A is an event, and G(i) a gate,
rA and rG(i) denote the transition rates associated with
A and G(i) respectively. The average duration of event A
(respectively gate G(i)) is denoted A (and G(i)).
The time delay between receiving all inputs to a gate,
and production of an output is g, where g ∈ [gmin, gmax].
Ar(A) represents the arrive rate of the event from the MCS.
A higher Ar(A) means that MCS spends less time between
the occurrence of the basic event to the top event A. N(t)
represents the smallest unit of time t.
C. Analysis process
In this section we outline the TFTs analysis process.
The full list of some properties of gates (AND, OR, XOR,
Voting) that are relevant to TFTs can be found in an extended
version of this paper [22]. In order to use the technique, the
following steps should be followed.
1) Complete the fault tree, and find the MCS. This step
is similar to that for traditional FTA.
2) Assign each event and gate a minimum and maximum
duration and delay between inputs and outputs respec-
tively.
3) Set the initial start time of the basic fault to 0.
4) From the bottom up, according to the rules of the
TFT model, incrementally calculate the minimum and
maximum actual time of each event.
5) Calculate the actual time of the hazard.
6) Analyse the chronological relationship between the
hazard and the MCS, and calculate the urgent basic
fault whose actual time is nearest to the hazard time.
7) Calculate the arrival rate of the hazard. Each MCS
corresponds to an arrival rate of the hazard. Calculate
each arrival rate, and sort arrival rates in ascending
order. The arrival rate reflects the average risk of the
basic fault. Thus, we get the average urgent basic fault.
8) Propose a solution to the hazard and use the TFT to
prove that the hazard will not occur in the future.
The time of an event and the gate is expressed via two
basic parameters: minimal time and maximal time. These
values can be obtained from field statistics, experiments, and
from values obtained using similar equipment. How much
time we need to stop a train in the emergency situation?
When we carry out the TFT method, we only need to know
the minimal and the maximal time of events and gates.
It is, of course, of greater value to use TFT analysis to
prevent accidents, and to produce emergency plans for hypo-
thetical situations so that we are prepared for future disasters.
However, we can only demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach by applying it to accidents that have occurred in
the past. In the next section, we demonstrate our method by
using it to analyse the China Yongwen railway accident.
IV. CASE STUDY
Figure 3 shows a timed fault tree model representing a
simple CRH EMU signal system in the China Yongwen rear-
end collision. In a normal state, a train is no closer than a
specified safe distance from another train. If a train detects
that another train ahead has come to within that safe distance
from it, its ATP will send a brake signal to the ATO, and
the ATO will brake the train. When the accident occurred
in 2011, a train failed to detect that another train had come
within the safe distance and so the brake signal was not
activated, resulting in a rear-end collision.
We can obtain the time values associated with the gate and
events in Figure 3 from known values for similar equipment.
For example, the maximum velocity a train can reach is 350
km/h in China, and the required safe distance is 6-8 km.
Therefore, if the brake systems fail, there can be a crash in
64.7 seconds. For this reason, the minimum time value of
G(1) is assigned to be 64.7 seconds. In China, it is required
that a change in equipment state should become visible in the
ATS central display within 1 second. Similarly, a command
should be issued to the controlled system within 1 second.
Table I
DURATION TIME OF THE GATES.
Gate Duration time (s)
G(1) [61.7, 90]
G(2) [0.1, 2]
G(3) [1, 4]
G(4) [0.5, 2]
G(5) [0.1, 1]
Table II
DURATION TIME AND ACTUAL TIME OF THE EVENTS.
Event Duration time (s) Actual time (s)
A [0, 0.1] [62, 114]
B(1) [0.1, 1] [0.9, 24]
B(2) [1, 7] [2.5, 21]
B(3) [0.1, 3] [0.7, 10]
B(4) [0.5, 10] [0.5, 10]
B(5) [1, 5] [1, 5]
B(6) [0.1, 1] [0.1, 1]
B(7) [0.1, 5] [0.1, 5]
B(8) [0.1, 5] [0.3, 7]
B(9) [0.1, 1] [0.1, 1]
B(10) [0.1, 1] [0.1, 1]
The times corresponding to each gate and event are shown
in Tables I and II. In Table II, we also give the actual time
for each event, obtained through the application of TFTs.
So, we can calculate the minimum time between fault and
hazard, which could help set the standard for maintenance.
We obtain the MCS: < B(4), B(7) >,< B(4),B (6) >,<
B(5), B(6) >,< B(5), B(7) >,< B(9), B(10) >. The time
relationship between the MCS and the hazard is shown in
Figure 4. The maximum actual time of B(4) is the closest to
the time of the hazard. As a result, B(4) should be prevented
with the greatest urgency.
Next, the transition rate is calculated based on the rules of
TFTs. For example, as the smallest time unit is 0.1 seconds
in this case, the duration time of B(1) is between 0.1 and 1
seconds. So, N(b)imin is 1, and N(b)
i
max is 10. According to
Equations (1) and (3) (see Section 4.3), the average duration
of event B(1) (N(B(1))) is 5. The transition rate of B(1)
(rB(1) ) is 0.2.
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Figure 3. A fault tree representation of a CRH EMU in a rear-end collision.
The durations and rates of the events and gates are shown
in Table III. According to the rules of TFTs, the arrival rate
of A corresponding to each MCS is as shown in Table IV.
The MCSs with minimum arrival rates are < B(4), B(6) >
and < B(4), B(7) >.
Table III
DURATIONS AND TRANSITION RATES OF EVENTS AND GATES.
Event and Gate Duration time (s) Transition rate
A 76 0.013
B(1) 5 0.2
B(2) 40 0.025
B(3) 15 0.667
B(4) 52 0.019
B(5) 30 0.033
B(6) 5 0.2
B(7) 25 0.04
B(8) 25 0.04
B(9) 5 0.2
B(10) 5 0.2
G(1) 76 0.013
G(2) 10 0.1
G(3) 25 0.04
G(4) 13 0.077
G(5) 25 0.04
To illustrate the results shown in Table IV, we calculate
MCS < B(4), B(7) >. The actual times of event B(4) and
B(7) are in the intervals [0.5, 10] and [0.1, 5] respectively.
Events B(4) and B(7) refer to “erroneous acquisition of
points positions” and “wrong localisation initialisation” re-
spectively.
Table IV
THE ARRIVAL RATE OF EACH MCS.
Minimal Cut Sets Arrival rate of A
B(7), B(4) 1/(2 ∗ 108)
B(2) 1/(2 ∗ 108)
B(3) 1/(1.1 ∗ 108)
B(4) 1/(1.1 ∗ 108)
B(5) 1/(4.8 ∗ 108)
B(6) 1/(4.8 ∗ 108)
The hazard (A) will occur if both events B(4) and B(7)
occur. As we can see from Figure 3, if B(4) occurs, the
hazard will take place after 52 seconds, and if B(7) occurs,
the hazard will take place after 57 seconds. Therefore, it
follows that the absolute safe times of maintenance of B(4)
and B(7) are 52 seconds and 57 seconds respectively.
Suppose that event B(7) has occurred. If event B(4)
subsequently occurs then the train will be in danger until
the fault is eliminated. Hence, if fault B(4) is not eliminated
in 52 seconds, some other effective measure will need to be
taken to prevent an accident.
V. FUTURE WORK
The European Train Control System (ETCS) has 4 levels
ranging from conventional operations up the use of satel-
lite based augmentation systems within minimal trackside
infrastructure. These higher levels of automation rely on
the computation of Tolerable Hazard Rates (THRs) for any
design. In other words, there is a probability of failure that
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Figure 4. The actual time of MCS and hazard.
is used to assess the suitability of any implementation. We
must show that any design or implementation can meet the
tolerable rate of hazards. The THR in ETCS was calculated
using conventional fault trees [23]. Much of our existing
models from the Chinese context might be re-used to support
the safety assessment of European infrastructures, especially
where accidents are so rare that we must transfer lessons
across national borders [24].
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